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ABSTRACT 
South Africa’s high involuntary unemployment and small informal sector are attributed to an 
underperforming formal sector and barriers to entry in the informal sector. This paper examines the 
economywide linkages between the formal and informal economies while accounting for different types 
of informal activities. A multiregion empirically calibrated general equilibrium model is developed 
capturing both product and labor markets. Three policy options are considered. First, results indicate that 
trade liberalization reduces national employment. At the same time, it increases formal employment, hurts 
informal producers, and favors informal traders, who benefit from lower import prices. Past liberalization 
may, therefore, partly explain South Africa’s small informal sector and its concentration among traders 
rather than producers. Second, wage subsidies on low-skilled formal workers increase national 
employment but hurt informal producers by heightening competition in domestic product markets. This 
suggests that it is insufficient to examine unemployment policies by focusing only on labor markets. 
Third, unconditional cash transfers stimulate demand for informally produced products, thereby raising 
informal employment without undermining formal producers. The transfer does, however, place a large 
fiscal burden on the state and is less effective at reducing national unemployment than a wage subsidy. 
Overall, these findings underline the importance of distinguishing between the formal and informal sector 
implications of socioeconomic policies. 
Keywords: informal economy, CGE model, South Africa  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment is one of South Africa’s most pressing socioeconomic challenges, affecting a quarter of 
the workforce. Rodrik (2008) identifies manufacturing’s poor performance relative to skill-intensive 
services as the main cause behind rising unemployment among lower-skilled job seekers. Moreover, most 
of manufacturing’s decline since the end of apartheid is attributed to low profitability caused by rising 
import competition. As a result, formal sector job creation has failed to keep pace with expanding labor 
force participation. It is expected then that the unemployed would turn to the informal sector, and, indeed, 
informal employment has accounted for most of the job creation over the last decade (Casale, Muller, and 
Posel 2004). However, despite that expansion, South Africa has a small informal sector compared with 
other countries at similar income levels (Maloney 2004; Schneider 2002). Supporting this observation, 
Kingdon and Knight (2004) show that unemployment in South Africa is involuntary and that informal 
work is preferred. This suggests that significant barriers to entry exist in the informal sector, such as poor 
access to credit, high levels of crime, and a reservation wage inflated by social transfers (Ranchhod 
2006).  
High unemployment in South Africa is thus attributed to an underperforming formal sector and to 
the inability of the unemployed to enter informal labor markets. However, few studies have examined the 
linkages between South Africa’s formal and informal sectors. In other words, how has the structure and 
size of the formal sector influenced employment incentives and opportunities in the informal sector? 
Moreover, studies that do consider formal–informal sector linkages typically focus on tax policies, such 
as expanding the tax base, or on labor market interactions, such as trade unions’ protection of formal 
employment (see, for example, Schultz and Mwabu 1998; Lucas and Hofmeyr 2001). Such studies do not 
address formal–informal sector competition in product markets, which may also influence the size and 
composition of the informal sector, and hence indirectly the high level of unemployment.  
In this paper we examine how South Africa’s formal sector affects informal production and 
employment. Given the diversity of the informal sector, Section 2 uses recent household and labor force 
surveys to develop a typology of informal activities based on their different interactions with the formal 
sector. Drawing on that typology, Section 3 constructs an empirically calibrated economywide model that 
captures formal–informal sector linkages in both product and labor markets. The model is used in Section 
4 to examine three policies that feature prominently in South Africa’s current unemployment debate: trade 
liberalization, formal sector wage subsidies, and unconditional cash transfers. Model results indicate that 
policies can produce diverging outcomes for formal and informal economies. More specifically, policies 
favoring formal sector job creation may in fact lower informal employment, while also having differential 
impacts on different kinds of informal activities. This suggests that formal–informal linkages can explain 
some of the small size of South Africa’s informal sector, as well as its concentration among traders rather 
than producers. These results also caution against adopting formal sector policies without considering 
informal sector impacts. The final section discusses these findings and their implications for future 
research. 
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2.  A TYPOLOGY OF INFORMAL ACTIVITIES AND EMPLOYMENT 
Contrasting Views of the Informal Economy 
In contrast to typical dual-economy models, the informal economy is quite diverse and has complex 
interactions with the formal sector. To begin with, scholars disagree about the role of informal activities 
in stimulating broader economic development (Devey, Skinner, and Valodia 2003). Some view the 
informal sector as a dynamic sector with the ability to create jobs and actively contribute to economywide 
growth. They regard informal activities as small enterprises that may eventually generate tax revenues 
through a gradual process of formalization. In contrast, others view informal activities as low-productivity 
employment or as survivalist strategies for poor households. From that perspective, the informal sector 
plays a passive role in development and acts as a temporary substitute for social protection during the 
formal-sector-led growth process. Evidence from recent surveys in South Africa reveals the heterogeneity 
of informal activities and suggests that there is room for both perspectives (Berry et al. 2002). Indeed, the 
informal economy comprises a continuum of survivalist and enterprise activities. This more nuanced view 
of the role of informal activities highlights the complexity of designing policies that account for 
differential impacts on formal and informal economies. 
There are also differences in the definition of the informal sector (Devey, Skinner, and Valodia 
2003). Here we draw a distinction between informal activities and informal employment. Some view 
informal workers as those who own or are employed by informal or unregistered firms. Indeed, this is the 
view held by official statistics in South Africa. In contrast, others take a broader view and include 
workers informally employed within the formal sector (Hussmanns 2001). For example, the former 
(narrower) definition includes informal producers and traders, whereas the latter (broader) definition 
includes day laborers and seasonal farmworkers working for formal firms or farms but without contracts 
or benefits. The distinction is important. For example, under the narrower definition, South Africa has a 
disproportionately small informal sector (i.e., 2.35 million informal workers, or one-fifth of total 
employment). Under the broader definition, an additional 1.45 million workers are classified as 
informally employed (excluding domestic workers and subsistence agriculturalists).1
A Typology of Formal–Informal Activities  
 This raises the share 
of broadly defined informal employment to more than one-third of total employment. Although this 
redefined informal sector measurement is not directly comparable across countries, it is more consistent 
with other countries at similar income levels (Maloney 2004; Schneider 2002). Thus, a broader view of 
informal employment is preferred to conventional distinctions between formal and informal sectors. It 
also highlights the complex linkages between formal and informal economies. 
We develop a typology based on the nature of informal activities’ interactions with the formal sector. 
Table 1 lists the four types of informal activities that we identify: (i) informal producers who compete 
with formal producers in product markets; (ii) informal traders who sell formal sector products and charge 
a fixed transaction cost margin; (iii) workers who are informally employed in producing formal sector 
products; and (iv) informally employed workers producing goods and services that are not produced by 
the formal sector (i.e., noncompetitive producers).  
The first category, informal producers, includes small enterprises producing goods and services 
that compete with formal sector firms producing similar products. Examples include processed foods, 
textiles, and clothing. Informal producers generate employment for other informal workers, and they 
compete in product markets based on the price at which they can supply their goods. Thus the main 
linkages between informal producers and the formal sector are through the purchasing of formal sector 
intermediates and through the selling of commodities under price competition to formal consumers. This 
employment type closely corresponds to the official definition of the informal sector (i.e., workers in 
                                                       
1 Calculations based on the 2004 Labor Force Survey (September) (StatsSA, 2004).  
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unregistered or untaxed businesses). According to the September 2004 Labor Force Survey (LFS2004) 
(StatsSA, 2004) about 1.55 million workers fell into this category out of a total employed workforce of 
10.6 million (see column 4 in Table 2). Note that this is total informal sector employment less informal 
traders, who form the second category in the typology.  
Table 1. Four types of informal employment 
 
Are distinct formal 
and informal goods 
produced? 
Is there price 
competition between 
formal and informal 
goods? 
Is there wage 
competition between 
formal and informal 
workers? 
Informal producers  




Yes  No 
Informal traders  





(fixed margin)  No 
Informally employed in formal sector 




No  Yes 
Noncompetitive informal activities 





(sold to formal sector)  No 
Informal traders differ from informal producers in that they do not produce a product but rather 
provide a service to consumers. Accordingly, they do not compete directly with formal producers over 
price. Rather, as a generalization, they purchase formal sector goods, which they sell on to consumers 
with a fixed markup or margin. This means that informally traded goods will often have a higher price 
than those that are formally traded. This higher price is possible because informal traders often trade 
formally purchased goods in smaller volumes than formal retailers (i.e., “regrating” or price 
discrimination) or they trade in closer proximity to final consumers (e.g., at taxi ranks or along the road). 
According to LFS2004, about 805,000 workers are engaged in informal trade, thus forming a large part of 
South Africa’s overall informal sector (see column 4 in Table 2).   
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Table 2. Employment profile, 2004 

















                Total employment (1,000s)  10,556  6,754  1,451  2,351  2,048  4,826  3,682 
                Employment share (%)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
     Agriculture  10.3  6.9  9.8  20.3  2.0  3.9  23.3 
     Manufacturing  14.7  18.9  5.4  8.3  11.2  21.2  8.1 
          Food and beverages  2.5  3.4  1.1  0.7  1.5  3.3  2.0 
          Textiles and clothing  2.9  3.0  1.2  3.6  0.6  5.3  1.0 
          Other manufactures  9.3  12.4  3.1  4.0  9.1  12.6  5.0 
     Construction  7.3  4.7  8.9  13.6  2.5  11.0  5.1 
     Mining and utilities  4.4  6.9  0.0  0.0  2.5  7.4  1.6 
     Services  63.3  62.6   75.9  57.7  81.8  56.5  62.0 
          Retail trade  17.7  14.1  7.3  34.3  10.3  20.4  18.2 
          Restaurants  3.3  3.6  2.5  3.0  3.0  5.0  1.3 
          Transport  4.8  5.0  3.2  5.1  5.6  6.4  2.2 
          Business  9.1  13.3  1.0  2.0  16.1  10.5  3.4 
          Government  10.4  16.2  0.0  0.0  29.2  7.7  3.5 
          Other services  18.1  10.3  61.9  13.4  17.5  6.6  33.4 
                Average wage (rand per worker)  19,662  26,175  10,015  8,032  38,609  19,198  9,792 
               
Source: Own calculations using the 2004 Labor Force Survey (September) (StatsSA, 2004). 
Notes: “Skilled workers” are professionals and managers; “semiskilled” are sales and technicians; and “unskilled” are all others. 
Some columns do not add to 100 percent due to rounding errors. 
Informally employed workers work in the formal sector on a somewhat casual basis (column 3 in 
Table 2). In other words, they do not have contracts, are not unionized, and receive no benefits. Examples 
include day laborers in the construction sector or seasonal agricultural workers working on commercial 
farms. Such workers compete with formal sector workers through their wage rates. In many developing 
countries, the textiles sector provides a good example to distinguish informal producers from informally 
employed workers. Informal producers may produce textiles that compete in local markets against 
formally produced and imported goods. At the same time, other workers may be casually employed in 
formal textile factories alongside contracted labor, producing goods that are sold in both local and foreign 
markets. Whereas the first type of formal–informal interaction is through price competition in product 
markets, the second type of interaction is through wage competition in labor markets. 
Finally, we include a fourth type of informal activity: workers who produce goods that are not 
produced by the formal sector. These types of workers are a subset of workers informally employed in the 
formal sector. For example, domestic workers might be considered casually employed in the formal sector 
(despite recent regulations), but they do not face competition from formal sector workers (since no formal 
sector firms produce domestic services). However, even though there is no competition to produce these 
services, they are entirely sold in the formal sector and are thus dependent on demand from formal sector 
consumers (in this case private households receiving most of their incomes from the formal sector). Thus 
there are still important formal sector linkages for this type of informal activity.  
Although any typology is an abstraction for a more complex reality, the preceding classification 
of informal activities and employment has the advantage of providing a clear framework for 
understanding how alternative policies may have differential effects on specific actors within the formal 
and informal economies. Our typology is less concerned with grouping workers based on differences in 
their specific jobs (for example, taxi drivers versus domestic workers). Rather it identifies the various 
transmission channels linking formal and informal activities, such as product market prices, labor market 
wages, and informal trader margins. In the next section we implement this typology within a broader 
economywide context and develop an integrated multisector model of South Africa’s formal and informal 
economies.   
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3.  MEASURING AND MODELING FORMAL–INFORMAL LINKAGES 
In this paper we develop a multiregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that captures the 
observed structure of South Africa’s formal and informal economies as well as the various linkages or 
transmission channels connecting their different economic actors (e.g., firms, traders, government, and 
investors). A CGE model is a system of equations that describes the functioning or behavior of an entire 
real economy (i.e., it covers all sectors, institutions, and markets). The parameters of the CGE equations 
are calibrated to observed data from a social accounting matrix (SAM). A SAM is an economywide 
database that accounts for all monetary flows in an economy within a specific year. It reconciles a wide 
range of data sources, including national accounts, household income and expenditure surveys, and labor 
force surveys. Our analysis therefore required the construction of both a specialized South African 
Formal–Informal Model (SAFIM) and an accompanying SAM. The mathematical specification of 
SAFIM is included in the appendix. This section presents a conceptual framework of the model and 
discusses its structure and core assumptions.  
Conceptual Framework of Formal–Informal Sector Linkages 
Figure 1 provides a conceptual framework of the formal–informal sector linkages in SAFIM. The model 
identifies two regions, representing the formal and informal economies. Each region produces and 
consumes commodities. The formal region produces a wide range of products and is fairly autonomous, 
since it produces most of the goods that it consumes and trades directly with the rest of the world. Formal 
sector firms and households pay taxes to the government, and invest their savings in formal financial 
institutions. In contrast, the informal region is far from autonomous, since it produces a narrower range of 
products and does not trade directly with the rest of the world.2
   
 Informal enterprises and households 
demand products that they do not produce themselves, and so they must purchase (“import”) goods from 
the formal region (i.e., the top interregional arrow in the figure). But this implies that informal region 
households are spending more money than they earn, which is not sustainable in the long run (i.e., does 
not describe an equilibrium situation). As shown in the figure, four linkages generate the earnings needed 
to finance the informal region’s trade deficit with the formal region. 
                                                       
2 The informal sector in South Africa does engage in international trade. For example, informal traders may travel to 
neighboring countries, such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, to sell their products in those markets. However, such trade is likely 
to be heavily concentrated along the border and is a very small share of the informal trade with the formal economy and of South 
Africa’s total trade with the rest of the world. For convenience it is excluded from our conceptual framework and empirical 
analysis.   
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework for the formal–informal economywide model 
 
First, the informal region generates external earnings by selling (“exporting”) products to the 
formal region. According to the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES2000) (StatsSA, 2000) about 5 
percent of formal households’ food purchases (in value terms) and 3 percent of their nonfood purchases 
were made in informal markets (see Table 3).3
Table 3. Informal market expenditure shares, 2000  
 In fact, formal and informal households reported similar 
informal market expenditure shares, thus highlighting the importance of bidirectional formal–informal 
trade. While lower-income households spend a greater share of their income in informal markets, 
households in the top expenditure deciles still purchase informally produced and traded products. Overall, 
the 2002 SAM, which is based on IES2000, estimates that informal sector exports to the formal region 
cover 77.5 percent of the informal economy’s trade deficit with the formal sector (and, indirectly, with the 
rest of the world). This underlines the importance of product markets for understanding formal–informal 
linkages.  
  Share of purchases (value) in informal markets (%) 
  Food products  Nonfood products 








          All expenditure deciles  5.1  10.1  3.2  6.6 
     Deciles 1–5  13.4  13.5  9.8  9.7 
     Deciles 6–8   9.2  11.3  6.8  7.1 
     Deciles 9   5.1  5.4  4.6  5.5 
     Deciles 10   1.9  3.1  1.6  4.0 
         
Source: Own calculations using 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (StatsSA 2000). 
Note: “Informal households” include all households reporting earnings from informal employment as well as households with all 
members who are unemployed.  
                                                       
3 We define “informal households” as those earning any income from the informal sector, including incomes from workers 
who are informally employed in the formal sector (see Section 2). We also include households that contain only unemployed 
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Formal purchase of 
informal goods 
Informal purchase of 
formal/foreign goods  
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The second source of external earnings for the informal economy is wages earned by workers 
who are informally employed in the formal sector. Following our two-region conceptual framework, these 
workers effectively “migrate” to the formal region on a daily basis and remit their wages back to 
households in the informal region (e.g., domestic workers working for formal households). These 
remitted incomes can then be used to cover the cost of imports from the formal sector. According to the 
2002 SAM, the remitted earnings from informally employed workers covered 15.1 percent of the informal 
sector’s trade deficit. 
The remaining two sources of external earnings for the informal sector lie outside of the product 
and labor markets. To begin with, the informal region is able to borrow externally in order to cover its 
formal sector purchases. This flow is reversed if informal households as a group are able to save some of 
their incomes. Second, and more important, informal households are net recipients of social transfers 
from the government, such as through public pensions or child support grants. Even though informal 
activities and households are exempt from direct (income and corporate) taxes, the social transfers from 
the government are still offset by indirect (sales and import) taxes that informal households effectively 
pay on their formal sector purchases (i.e., on final and intermediate demand). Netting out these indirect 
tax payments, the 2002 SAM estimates that government inward transfers account for 7.4 percent of the 
informal sector’s trade deficit with the formal sector.  
The conceptual framework is a simple representation of the major linkages that need to be 
captured in any comprehensive model of the formal and informal economies. It therefore provides a 
foundation for understanding the workings of the more detailed economywide model.  
The Formal–Informal Economywide Model  
SAFIM is a multiregional CGE model in which formal and informal economies are represented as regions 
within the broader South African economy. As seen in Table 2, the formal economy contains most of 
South Africa’s heavier industries (e.g., mining and metals) as well as commercial agriculture and 
financial services. In contrast, the informal sector covers subsistence agriculture, some lighter 
manufacturing subsectors, such as food and clothing, and a significant share of trade and transport 
services. To capture this heterogeneity, SAFIM contains detailed information on demand and supply for 
26 economic sectors or commodities in each of the formal and informal regions. Producers in each sector 
and region employ labor and capital under the assumption of constant returns to scale and profit 
maximization. For this we use a nested production system, with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function determining factor demand, and a Leontief function combining value-added and intermediates.  
SAFIM separates skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, which are used with differing 
intensity in each sector and region. Skilled labor is assumed to be fully employed earning a flexible real 
wage. In contrast, the supply of semiskilled and unskilled workers is perfectly elastic at a fixed real wage, 
reflecting the high levels of unemployment observed for these skill groups in South Africa. Based on 
prevailing wages, all workers from the informal region can seek employment from both informal 
producers and formal sector firms. This specification of labor markets, together with the separation of 
formal and informal regions, allows SAFIM to capture the three types of informal employment identified 
in Section 2: informal producers, workers informally employed in the formal sector, and noncompetitive 
informal jobs (see Table 1). Finally, capital stocks are immobile across sectors and earn sector-specific 
returns. The model therefore reflects the complex labor market linkages between the formal and informal 
sectors. 
The second formal–informal economy linkage is trade. The model explicitly allows for both 
interregional and international trade (i.e., trade between the formal and informal regions, and between 
South Africa and the rest of the world). Import competition and export opportunities are captured by 
allowing producers and consumers in the formal and informal regions to shift between “regional” and 
foreign markets depending on the relative prices of imports, exports, and locally produced goods. More 
specifically, the decision of formal and informal producers to supply local, regional, or foreign markets is 
governed by a nonnested constant elasticity of transformation function. Similarly, substitution  
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possibilities between local and imported goods are captured by a CES Armington function. This 
specification permits two-way trade between the formal and informal regions, which, as shown in Table 
3, is an important characteristic of formal–informal interactions.4
Household income and expenditure patterns vary considerably across households living in the 
formal and informal economies. Such differences are important, since the incomes earned by workers in 
different sectors benefit households differently according to their initial factor endowments. To capture 
those differences, the model further separates households in the formal and informal economies into four 
income subgroups (i.e., expenditure deciles 1–5, 6–8, 9, and 10). These representative households receive 
factor incomes and social transfers from the formal sector government. This is the third linkage between 
the formal and informal sectors (see Figure 1). Despite these social transfers, informal households receive 
most of their income from lower-skilled workers, whereas formal households receive a greater share from 
capital and higher-skilled workers. All households save some of their income (based on fixed marginal 
propensities to save), but only formal households pay direct taxes (based on fixed tax rates). Tax rates are 
highest on higher-income formal households. All households use their remaining income to consume 
commodities under a Cobb-Douglas demand function.
 This means that if the informal region 
is initially a net importer of a particular product, it can still become a net exporter if policies, prices, or 
productivity improve. Finally, the model also captures the transaction costs that are generated by all 
goods entering or leaving the informal economy. The transaction costs are paid to the informal retail trade 
sector. SAFIM therefore captures how changes in trade patterns between the formal and informal sectors 
generate incomes for informal traders. This is the final kind of informal employment identified in the 
typology (see Table 1).   
5
Macroeconomic balance is maintained through three “closure” rules. First, for the government 
account, all tax rates are fixed, and direct and indirect tax revenues are pooled at the national level. These 
are used to pay for social transfers to households, which are per capita based, and to cover public 
savings/investment, which are a fixed share of total revenues. The remaining revenues are used for public 
consumption spending, which generates demand for formal sector products only. Second, for the foreign 
account, a flexible national exchange rate adjusts to maintain a fixed current account balance measured in 
foreign currency. Since the domestic price index is the model’s numerraire, the exchange is the ratio of 
the price of tradables to nontradables (i.e., the real exchange rate). Finally, for the savings/investment 
account, all savings rates are fixed and the supply of loanable funds are pooled at the national level. This 
is used to finance investment spending, which generates demand for imported and formal sector 
commodities. Because the model is comparative static, there is no second-period effect on productive 
capital stocks from changes in investment.  
 
Calibration of the Model 
SAFIM is calibrated to the 2002 South African Formal–Informal Sector SAM. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the 2002 national SAM (see Thurlow 2005) was disaggregated across formal and informal 
sectors using labor income shares from LFS2004. This assumes that the production technologies of the 
formal and informal sectors are the same, and that intermediate demand patterns can be allocated in 
proportion to workers’ incomes. All government, investment, and foreign export demand is allocated to 
formal sector products. Household consumption demand was separated into demand for formal and 
informal products using detailed informal market consumption shares from IES2000 (see Table 3). 
Together this provides an estimate of total demand in the formal and informal economies. Finally, we 
                                                       
4 Initial trade flows between the formal and informal economies were estimated using the informal market expenditure 
shares shown in Table 3, but for a more detailed range of products. Total demand is then compared with production, which was 
itself estimated using national accounts and labor income data from LFS2004. The CGE model is therefore calibrated to observed 
formal–informal production structures and consumer behavior.  
5 We experimented with the more flexible linear expenditure system of demand, but that produced similar model results. 
The Cobb-Douglas functional form assumes that the share of disposable income spent on a particular product is independent of a 
household’s income (i.e., unitary income elasticities). The static nature of our model lessens the consequences of that assumption, 
since household incomes do not change dramatically.   
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assume the foreign import penetration is the same across formal and informal sectors. Thus, at this stage, 
the difference between total demand and supply is the value of regional imports (i.e., a residual approach 
to estimating trade between two regions). Remaining household incomes and expenditures are based on 
government accounts and on reported nonfactor incomes in IES2000. The final SAM represents the 
structural characteristics of the formal and informal economies, including production, trade, and incomes. 
The initial, or “base,” structure of SAFIM is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Economic structure of South Africa’s informal economy, 2002 
  Share of total GDP (%)  Informal sector’s 
share of national 
total (%) 
Informal trade shares and intensities (%) 












  GDP  Employment 
                    All sectors  100.0  100.0  100.0  7.1  22.3  100.0  100.0  66.6  73.7 
     Agriculture  3.9  9.3  4.3  15.2  43.9  8.6  6.2  82.5  82.6 
     
Manufacturing 
20.7  9.1  19.9  3.3  12.6  12.0  53.8  56.4  89.1 
          Food 
and beverages 
3.2  0.6  3.0  1.5  6.4  1.8  18.5  90.0  99.2 
          Textiles 
and clothing 
0.9  1.7  0.9  12.9  27.5  2.8  5.0  64.2  81.5 
          Other 
manufactures 
16.6  6.8  16.0  3.0  9.7  7.3  30.3  49.5  85.1 
     
Construction 
1.7  10.0  2.3  31.2  41.7  19.3  0.0  73.6  0.0 
     Mining and 
utilities 
12.1  0.0  11.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.6  0.0  100.0 
     Services  61.6  71.6  62.3  8.2  20.3  60.1  34.4  65.2  60.1 
          Retail 
trade 
10.2  41.5  12.4  23.7  43.1  30.0  1.0  61.2  6.7 
          
Restaurants 
0.9  1.6  1.0  11.3  20.1  1.5  1.0  60.7  60.5 
          
Transport 
8.8  18.5  9.5  13.9  23.7  18.8  8.1  72.0  60.9 
          Business  19.9  3.1  18.7  1.2  4.9  0.9  16.5  22.2  87.8 
          
Government 
16.0  0.0  14.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  100.0 
          Other 
services 
5.8  7.0  5.9  8.5  16.5  8.9  7.6  85.1  87.2 
                   
Source: Own calculations using the 2002 South African Formal–Informal Sector Social Accounting Matrix. 
Note: The “informal sector” in this table excludes the contribution of informally employed labor working in the formal sector 
(see Table 1).   
The informal economy (narrowly defined) contributes 7.1 percent to South Africa’s total GDP but 
generates 22.3 percent of total employment (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 4). This reflects the low wage 
rates and high labor intensity of the informal sector. The largest informal sectors are retail trade (41.5 
percent), transport (18.5 percent), construction (10.0 percent), and subsistence agriculture (9.3 percent) 
(see column 2 in Table 4). Key informal manufacturing sectors include food processing and textiles. Food 
processing is an important traded product between the formal and informal sectors. Formal products 
supply almost all informal food consumption demand, and 90 percent of informal food production is 
supplied to the formal sector (see columns 8 and 9 in Table 4). Overall, the high import and export 
intensities reflect the considerable bidirectional trade that exists between the formal and informal 
economies. The higher import intensity is consistent with the trade deficit that the informal sector runs  
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with the formal sector. Earlier in this section it was said that interregional trade covers around three-
quarters of the deficit. This means that around half of the overall deficit is covered by informal “exports” 
of retail trade, transport, and construction. This underlines the importance of informal services over 
informal agricultural and manufacturing producers. 
“Informal households” are those earning income from the informal sector as well as from workers 
informally employed in the formal sector. We also include households with all members unemployed, 
since their nonzero consumption levels cannot be excluded from the economywide model, and because 
their demand patterns are closer to those of informal households. Based on this definition and according 
to IES2000, around two-thirds of South Africa’s population is part of the informal economy (see Table 5). 
Informal households are typically poorer than formal households, with 66.6 percent of the informal 
population in the lowest five expenditure deciles, compared with 24.9 percent of the formal population. In 
contrast, only 7.8 percent of the informal population is in the highest two expenditure deciles.  
In summary, SAFIM captures the initial economic structure of South Africa at a detailed sector 
level and across both factor and product markets. SAFIM’s multiregional specification also allows it to 
capture the various formal–informal linkages depicted in the conceptual framework in Figure 1 (i.e., 
interregional trade, intersectoral labor migration, and social transfers). Finally, the model captures the 
four kinds of informal activities and employment identified in the typology in Table 1, including 
producers, traders, and workers employed without contracts or benefits. SAFIM’s detailed structural and 
behavioral characteristics, and its calibration to observed South African data, make it an ideal tool for 
examining socioeconomic policies. 
Table 5. Household population patterns, 2000 






        Population (1,000s)  17,404  26,291  43,694 
        All expenditure deciles (%)  100.0  100.0  100.0 
     Deciles 1–5  24.9  66.6  50.0 
     Deciles 6–8   34.6  26.9  30.0 
     Deciles 9   17.6  5.0  10.0 
     Deciles 10   20.9  2.8  10.0 
       
Source: Own calculations using 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (StatsSA 2000) 
Note: “Informal households” include all households reporting earnings from informal employment as well as households where 
all members are unemployed.Some columns do not add to 100 percent due to rounding errors. 
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4.  THREE POLICY SIMULATIONS 
SAFIM is used to assess the effectiveness of three different policies in generating employment and raising 
household incomes. The policies are trade liberalization, wage subsidies, and unconditional cash transfers. 
We also consider how previous national-level assessments of these policies may have concealed 
differential outcomes for formal and informal economies.  
Trade Liberalization  
South Africa underwent rapid trade liberalization during the 1990s. At the same time both unemployment 
and poverty worsened. Further relaxation of trade restrictions has therefore been the subject of much 
debate. A number of sector studies find that liberalization reduced industrial employment, albeit only 
slightly (see, for example, Bhorat 1999; Edwards 2001). Economywide studies find divergent outcomes 
for industry and services but also indicate a net decline in national employment (Thurlow 2007; Hérault 
and Thurlow forthcoming). Within this context, we use SAFIM to simulate the impact of eliminating all 
remaining import tariffs in 2002. Table 6 shows the initial rates and tariff collections. We replace lost 
government revenues by raising direct tax rates in order to maintain public recurrent consumption 
spending at its initial level. Tax rate increases include both corporate and personal income tax rates and 
are proportional to initial rates (i.e., increasing tax rates produces regressive outcomes). 
Table 6. Initial tariff rates and collections, 2002 










        Total GDP  100.0  100.0  2.8 
Agriculture  2.9  2.2  3.7 
Manufacturing  95.9  70.2  3.9 
     Food and beverages  5.0  2.5  5.6 
     Textiles and clothing  21.0  3.2  18.5 
     Other manufactures  69.9  64.5  3.1 
Construction  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Mining and utilities  0.0  11.2  0.0 
Services  1.2  16.2  0.2 
     Retail trade  0.0  0.3  0.0 
     Restaurants  0.0  2.8  0.0 
     Transport  0.0  3.9  0.0 
     Business  1.1  2.5  1.3 
     Government  0.0  1.2  0.0 
     Other services  0.0  6.7  0.0 
       
Source: Own calculations using the 2002 South African Formal–Informal Sector Social Accounting Matrix  
Note: Some columns do not add to 100 percent due to rounding errors. 
Table 7 shows the changes in production under the three policy simulations. Trade liberalization 
reduces tariffs on South Africa’s foreign imports, which reduces import prices and raises demand for 
imported products. The highest tariffs in 2002 were on textiles and clothing. Therefore, those sectors face 
the largest increase in import competition when tariffs are eliminated, with the production of textiles and 
clothing declining by 4.7 percent (see column 3 in Table 7). Moreover, textile producers in both the 
formal and informal sectors are adversely affected by cheaper imported products. The overall increase in 
imports has macroeconomic implications, since it places pressure on the current account balance, which is  
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assumed to be fixed in foreign currency. The real exchange rate therefore depreciates by 2 percent in 
order to offset some of the increase in foreign import demand and encourage foreign exports. This 
depreciation causes a slight increase in production among nontextile manufacturing sectors, such as 
processed foods, metals, and wood products. However, because it is the formal sector that engages in 
foreign exports and not informal producers, formal producers of processed foods and other manufactured 
goods benefit. Hence, whereas formal production in these sectors increases, production declines for 
informal producers, who face higher import competition without any improved access to foreign export 
markets.  
Table 7. Changes in production under alternative policy simulations  
  Change in gross domestic product from base value (%) 
  Trade liberalization  Wage subsidy  Unconditional cash transfer 













                    Total GDP  0.32  -1.13  0.21  1.47  -0.07  1.36  0.01  2.01  0.15 
     Agriculture  0.25  -0.17  0.19  0.41  -0.27  0.31  0.79  2.30  1.02 
     
Manufacturing 
0.17  -7.87  -0.09  1.94  -7.25  1.64  0.13  1.69  0.18 
          Food and 
beverages 
0.06  -1.12  0.05  1.97  -9.95  1.80  1.18  1.62  1.18 
          Textiles 
and clothing 
-4.57  -5.33  -4.67  5.36  -5.80  3.92  1.45  5.21  1.94 
          Other 
manufactures 
0.44  -9.13  0.15  1.76  -7.36  1.48  -0.15  0.82  -0.12 
     
Construction 
-0.20  -3.51  -1.23  3.02  -1.17  1.71  -0.57  -1.05  -0.72 
     Mining and 
utilities 
1.34  0.00  1.34  1.99  0.00  1.99  0.20  0.00  0.20 
     Services  0.18  -0.06  0.16  1.24  1.02  1.22  -0.11  2.45  0.10 
          Retail 
trade 
-0.24  0.00  -0.19  2.47  1.24  2.18  0.28  2.45  0.79 
          
Restaurants 
0.57  -0.41  0.46  6.42  0.77  5.78  0.38  5.17  0.92 
          
Transport 
0.33  -0.02  0.28  1.59  0.85  1.49  0.46  2.57  0.76 
          Business  -0.14  -0.61  -0.15  1.39  -0.01  1.37  0.01  2.16  0.03 
          
Government 
0.74  0.00  0.74  -0.58  0.00  -0.58  -0.95  0.00  -0.95 
          Other 
services 
0.23  -0.23  0.19  2.18  0.74  2.06  0.22  1.65  0.34 
                   
Source: Results from the South African Formal–Informal Model (SAFIM).  
Note: The “informal sector” in this table excludes the contribution of informally employed labor working in the formal sector 
(see Table 1).   
Falling informal production reduces employment among informal producers (see column 2 in 
Table 8). This is especially pronounced for semiskilled informal producers and workers, who are more 
intensively engaged in manufacturing. However, the increase in production within the formal sector 
(driven by expanding exports) generates additional jobs for formal workers, primarily for high-skilled and 
unskilled workers in the service sectors. There is also increased demand for informally employed workers 
in the formal sector, although this benefits mainly lower-skilled workers. Finally, the decline in informal 
production and foreign import prices encourages informal consumers to become more reliant on foreign  
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imported goods. This shift in consumer preferences increases the amount of trade between the informal 
and formal sectors, thus benefiting informal traders, who collect fixed transaction margins based on the 
volume of trade. Thus, whereas employment for informal producers falls under trade liberalization, lower-
skilled informal traders experience a slight increase in employment.  
Table 8. Changes in employment under alternative policy simulations  
  Base 
employment 
(1,000s) 
Change in employment from base (%) 
  Trade 
liberalization 
Wage subsidy  Unconditional 
cash transfer 
          Total employment  10,556  -0.13  3.60  1.58 
     Skilled  2,048  0.00  0.00  0.00 
     Semiskilled  4,826  -0.42  6.03  1.28 
     Unskilled  3,682  0.17  2.42  2.83 
          Formal workers  6,754  0.42  5.63  0.49 
     Skilled  1,898  0.14  -0.03  -0.33 
     Semiskilled  3,524  0.52  8.77  0.63 
     Unskilled  1,332  0.57  5.41  1.26 
          Informally employed  1,451  0.43  0.53  0.82 
     Skilled  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 
     Semiskilled  357  0.05  -0.08  0.79 
     Unskilled  1,095  0.55  0.73  0.83 
          Informal traders  805  0.01  2.61  5.29 
     Skilled  18  -0.45  2.23  4.72 
     Semiskilled  265  0.02  2.61  5.31 
     Unskilled  522  0.02  2.61  5.31 
          Informal producers  1,545  -3.16  -1.86  5.11 
     Skilled  132  -1.94  0.17  4.09 
     Semiskilled  681  -5.73  -3.59  3.34 
     Unskilled  733  -0.99  -0.61  6.94 
         
Source: Results from the South African Formal–Informal Model (SAFIM).  
Note: “Formal workers” refers to formally employed workers in the formal sector; “informally employed” refers to informally 
employed workers in the formal sector (see Table 1). Some columns do not add to 100 percent due to rounding errors. 
Overall, trade liberalization causes employment to fall slightly, despite an overall increase in 
national GDP. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies (see, for example, Thurlow 2007). 
However, national results hide divergent outcomes for formal and informal sectors. Total informal 
production declines significantly, leading to a similar decline in informal employment. In contrast, formal 
sector producers and their workers, especially in the service sectors, benefit from improved access to 
foreign export markets, which more than offsets the losses caused by increased import competition. Total 
formal GDP therefore rises and creates new formal sector employment opportunities. The opening of 
South Africa’s economy since the early 1990s may therefore have contributed to the small size of South 
Africa’s informal sector relative to the formal economy. Moreover, model results indicate that trade 
liberalization alters the composition of the informal economy. There is a shift in employment away from 
informal producers toward informal traders and workers informally employed in the formal sector. This is 
consistent with the observation that South Africa has a small informal producer sector and a 
disproportionately large informal trader sector (Blaauw 2005). 
Table 9 shows changes in household incomes following trade liberalization. The income changes 
include a 6 percent increase in direct taxes that is needed to offset lost revenue from eliminating import 
tariffs, which amounts to 9.6 billion rand (i.e., about 1 percent of national GDP in 2002). This tax increase  
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affects only formal households and is based on tax collection rates. Overall there is a slight decline in real 
household disposable incomes due to falling employment. That offsets lower consumer prices and slightly 
higher national GDP. However, impacts across household groups differ significantly. Previous studies 
find that trade liberalization benefited households in the middle of the income distribution (Thurlow 
2007). Our results are consistent, since incomes rise for national deciles 5 through 9, but fall for other 
household groups. Disposable incomes for the highest expenditure decile fall substantially because most 
households in this group are in the formal sector and face the highest marginal tax rates. They therefore 
bear the brunt of the required revenue-replacing tax increase. However, there are different distributional 
implications from trade liberalization for formal and informal households. The informal households at the 
top of the income distribution benefit the most from trade liberalization. That is because those informal 
households have fewer unemployed members compared with lower-income informal households. They 
are also not subject to the increase in direct taxes, and are less affected by the drop in employment for 
semiskilled workers. Thus, while the bottom nine deciles for formal households experience rising 
incomes, the bottom eight informal deciles experience declining incomes. Thus, the decline in incomes 
among poorer households observed at the national level is driven by falling informal household incomes.  
Table 9. Changes in incomes under alternative policy simulations  
  Change in income from base (%) 






        All households  -0.29  1.51  1.39 
     Deciles 1–5  -0.09  2.13  24.13 
     Deciles 6–8   0.09  2.68  5.29 
     Deciles 9   0.15  2.44  1.14 
     Deciles 10   -0.53  0.89  -1.81 
        Formal households  -0.31  1.59  -0.80 
     Deciles 1–5  0.24  3.23  6.47 
     Deciles 6–8   0.30  3.49  2.44 
     Deciles 9   0.17  2.68  0.34 
     Deciles 10   -0.56  0.88  -2.08 
        Informal households  -0.21  0.99  16.15 
     Deciles 1–5  -0.46  0.84  44.85 
     Deciles 6–8   -0.39  0.84  11.76 
     Deciles 9   0.02  1.14  5.52 
     Deciles 10   0.15  1.25  4.04 
       
Source: Results from the South African Formal–Informal Model (SAFIM).  
Note: Incomes are post-tax (i.e., disposable); “informal households” refers to all households reporting earnings from informal 
employment as well as households wherein all members are unemployed. 
In summary, trade liberalization has different implications for South Africa’s formal and informal 
sectors. It substantially reduces informal employment by raising import competition without providing 
additional opportunities for informal producers to access foreign export markets. In contrast, formal 
producers are better able to take advantage of the new foreign market opportunities, and their production 
expands as a result. Trade liberalization also alters the composition of the informal sector, by reducing 
product market space for informal producers, increasing opportunities for informal traders, and 
encouraging informal workers to seek casual employment in the formal sector. Ultimately, it is the 
adverse effect that trade liberalization has on the informal sector that reduces total employment in spite of 
new employment opportunities in the formal sector. This highlights the need for policies to support 
further employment creation and raise incomes among poor households. 
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Wage Subsidy 
There is ongoing debate in South Africa regarding the effectiveness of a wage subsidy to reduce 
unemployment. Two studies have examined this policy option using national CGE models (Pauw and 
Edwards 2006; Go et al. 2009). Those studies find that a wage subsidy targeted toward lower-skilled 
workers raises the overall level of employment, despite the need for compensating tax increases and 
possible inflexibilities in the labor market. In this section we provide a 7 percent wage subsidy to all 
semiskilled and unskilled workers in the formal sector, which is only slightly below the 10 percent wage 
subsidy simulated in previous studies. We target a lower wage subsidy so that the required increase in 
direct taxes to maintain a balanced fiscal budget is the same as under the previous trade liberalization 
scenario. 
The wage subsidy reduces the cost of workers for firms and increases demand for labor. There is 
consequently a substantial increase in employment for semiskilled and unskilled labor in the formal sector 
(see column 3 in Table 8). There is also a modest shift in demand away from skilled workers and capital.6
Again, the national results hide differential outcomes for the formal and informal sectors. This is 
because the wage subsidy reduces the cost of production in the formal sector but does not benefit informal 
producers. As a result, the price of formal products declines relative to informal products. This causes 
consumers to shift demand toward formal products at the expense of informal producers, whose 
production declines significantly (see column 5 in Table 7). It also encourages greater export growth, 
which benefits only formal sector firms. Informal workers therefore migrate toward those sectors that face 
a smaller penetration of formal sector products and fewer opportunities for export displacement. That 
includes much of the service sector, where trade intensities are lowest (see the final two columns of Table 
4). Despite this migration to services, there is still a sharp overall decline in employment among informal 
producers. Falling formal sector prices and increased trade with the formal sector does, however, benefit 
informal traders. Increased formal sector production also benefits workers who are informally employed 
in the formal sector, despite the substantial overall shift in labor demand toward formally employed 
workers (i.e., who are eligible to receive the subsidy).  
 
The largest increases in employment are within the more labor-intensive sectors, which benefit the most 
from the subsidy. Those sectors include textiles and clothing and construction, whose formal sector 
production expands significantly under this policy simulation (see column 4 in Table 7). Overall, national 
employment rises by 3.6 percent as a result of the wage subsidy. 
Even though informal production declines slightly, informal households’ disposable real incomes 
still rise as a result of the wage subsidy. This is partly because of the offsetting increase in employment 
for traders and informally employed workers in the formal sector. However, the main driver behind rising 
informal incomes is the sharp decline in consumer prices caused by the lower cost of production. This 
result suggests that if producers pass the cost reduction on to consumers, then real incomes will rise even 
among nonrecipient households in the informal sector. Again, the informal households toward the higher 
end of the income distribution benefit more than lower-income informal households. This is because 
semiskilled workers in the informal sector are more heavily concentrated among higher-income informal 
households. In contrast, higher-income formal sector households are more reliant on high-skilled workers, 
who did not receive the wage subsidy in our simulation. Moreover, such higher-income households 
experience the largest increases in direct taxes in order to cover the cost of the subsidy. Consequently, it is 
lower-income formal sector households that benefit the most from the targeted wage subsidy.  
In summary, a targeted wage subsidy greatly expands employment and real incomes but favors 
households toward the middle of the national income distribution. This is because informal producers face 
increased competition from subsidized formal sector producers. This encourages a shift in the 
composition of informal employment toward traders and casual employment. Thus, even though our 
results are consistent with previous national-level studies, they again highlight the importance of taking 
                                                       
6 Our simulation is broadly equivalent to that of Pauw and Edwards (2006) and to the “medium” case simulation presented 
in Go et al. (2009).   
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formal–informal linkages into account, as well as considering the effects of employment policies on both 
labor and product markets.  
Unconditional Cash Transfers 
An alternative policy to the wage subsidy that has also received considerable attention in South Africa is 
an unconditional cash transfer, also called a basic income grant. Such transfers would be paid to all South 
Africans irrespective of age, work status, or income level. The policy would be financed by increased 
taxes. Numerous studies have examined the impact of the cash transfer on household welfare. Thurlow 
(2002) uses a CGE model to estimate the economywide impact of providing a 100 rand per person per 
month transfer to all South Africans. In this section we simulate a smaller transfer of 60 rand per month, 
since this would already involve a direct tax rate increase twice the size of that in the previous simulations 
(i.e., 13 percent instead of 6 percent).  
Our results are consistent with those from previous studies. The cash transfer increases disposable 
incomes for all households, except for formal sector households in the highest expenditure decile (see the 
final column of Table 9). Those households are hit with the largest increases in tax rates in order to 
maintain a balanced fiscal budget. Given their importance in determining the absolute level of formal 
sector consumption spending, the required increase in taxes more than offsets the additional income from 
the cash transfer, causing real formal sector incomes to fall. The transfer also has different implications 
for households within the informal economy. More specifically, the value of the grant as a percentage of 
current incomes is much larger for lower-income households. Real per capita incomes therefore increase 
by 44.9 percent for the bottom five informal deciles, compared with only 4.0 percent for the highest 
informal decile.  
Large increases in informal household incomes generate additional demand for informally 
produced products, especially processed foods, informal restaurants, and transport services (see column 8 
in Table 7). This increase in demand generates additional employment and marketing opportunities for 
informal producers, whose employment rises substantially. The increase in income also generates 
additional demand for imported and formal sector products, which benefits informal traders. Overall, the 
unconditional cash transfer raises national production and employment, despite some slight adverse 
implications for formal sector production. However, the fiscal burden of the cash transfer is significant, 
representing more than 2 percent of national GDP in the current simulation, and almost 5 percent for the 
120 rand per capita grant that is currently being debated. Our analysis indicates that there would have to 
be a substantial increase in direct taxes, with severe implications for higher-income households. We do 
not consider the effects of the grant on capital flight, declining foreign investment, and tax evasion, any of 
which would increase the necessary tax hikes and could possibly undermine long-term economic growth. 
However, despite its relatively small and possibly overestimated impact on national production, the 
results from our analysis do confirm the strongly pro-poor outcomes of an unconditional cash transfer. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
Unemployment is one of South Africa’s most pressing social challenges. Existing studies identify the 
underperformance of the formal sector and the existence of barriers to entry in the informal sector as the 
primary explanations for high unemployment. Our study has extended that literature by considering the 
linkages between the formal and informal economies. We adopted a broader view of informal 
employment, by including workers who are informally employed in the formal sector. We found that this 
explains some of South Africa’s disproportionately small informal sector. However, even under the 
broader view, our results indicated that most of the interactions between the formal and informal sectors 
occur within product markets. We therefore adopted an economywide perspective and accounted for 
formal–informal interactions in both factor and product markets. Finally, we considered differences in 
behavior among informal activities. Drawing on a typology of informal employment, we developed a 
multiregion CGE model that is empirically calibrated to the structure and behavior of South African 
formal and informal economies. We used the model to examine three policies designed to expand 
production and employment.    
Model results indicate that whereas trade liberalization reduces national employment, it has 
sharply different implications for formal and informal sectors. Formal sector production and employment 
expands, in part due to enhanced production efficiency and improved export opportunities. In contrast, 
increased import competition undermines informal producers and encourages informal workers to move 
into trading and casual employment in the formal sector. This result suggests that past trade liberalization 
may explain some of the small size of South Africa’s informal sector, as well as its concentration within 
trading rather than production. Whereas formal sector households are the main beneficiaries of trade 
liberalization, lower import prices also benefit higher-income informal households. The overall effect of 
liberalization is, however, a widening of the income gap between rich and poor households, and between 
formal and informal sectors. Further trade liberalization is therefore unlikely to generate the employment 
and income opportunities needed to reduce unemployment significantly in South Africa. 
We also examined the impact of introducing a wage subsidy to stimulate labor demand, and of 
using an unconditional cash transfer to raise incomes directly. A wage subsidy raises employment 
substantially at the national level. However, it also favors formal sector producers, whose lower cost of 
production allows them to reduce their market prices. This heightens competition between formal and 
informal producers in domestic product markets and causes a substantial decline in informal employment. 
Increased trade with the formal sector does, however, benefit informal traders. A wage subsidy would 
therefore further narrow South Africa’s informal sector toward the greater trading of formal and imported 
products. In contrast, an unconditional cash transfer stimulates demand for informally produced products 
and causes a substantial increase in informal producer employment, while also benefiting informal 
traders. The cash transfer also has the largest positive impact on lower-income households’ incomes and 
helps narrow the income gap between formal and informal households. However, the large size of the 
cash transfer requires substantial increases in tax rates, which adversely affect formal sector households, 
especially at the higher end of the income distribution. Moreover, the cash transfer is less effective at 
stimulating national production than a wage subsidy. 
Beyond their policy implications, our findings confirm the need to assess the differential 
implications of policies on formal and informal economies. This is because the results of previous studies 
have hidden sharply divergent outcomes for formal and informal enterprises and households, which 
should ideally be considered when assessing alternative socioeconomic policies. Finally, our results 
highlight the importance of capturing differences in behavior across the full spectrum of informal 
activities, as well as the need to consider both labor and production market conditions when designing 
policies to address South Africa’s unemployment challenge. 
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APPENDIX:  MATHEMATICAL SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL  
Table A.1. Model equations  
Prices     
Import price    1 
Export price    2 
Domestic sales price    3 
Activity price    4 
Value-added price    5 
Price margin    6 
Consumer price index    7 
Domestic price index    8 
Production and trade     
Intermediate demand    9 
Gross output    10 
Production function    11 
Production function 
first-order condition 
  12 
Export transformation 
function  
  13 
Export transformation 
first-order condition 
  14 
Nonexport/domestic 
commodities 
  15 
Import substitution 
function     16 
Import substitution 
first-order condition 
  17 
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Table A.1. Continued 
Production and trade continued   
Nonimport or domestic 
commodities 
  18 
Transaction costs    19 
Factors and institutions 
Factor incomes    20 
Household incomes    21 




Investment demand    24 
Government demand    25 
System constraints     
Product market 
equilibrium 
  26 
Factor market 
equilibrium 
  27 
Government balance    28 
Savings/investment 
balance 
  29 
Current account 
balance 
  30 
Regional balance    31 
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Table A.2. Model sets, parameters, and variables 
Sets or indexes  Sets or indexes 
a  Activities  t  All regions (domestic and foreign) 
c  Commodities  r  Domestic regions (formal and informal) 
f  Factor (labor and capital)  w  Foreign region (rest of world) 
h  Households     
Parameters or exogenous variables  Parameters or exogenous variables 
  Import substitution shift parameter    Per capita transfer from government 
  Export transformation shift parameter    Transaction cost margin (from t to t') 
  Production function shift parameter    Household population 
  Average household budget share    World export price 
  Import substitution share parameter    World import price 
  Export transformation share parameter    Base government demand quantity 
  Production function share parameter    Base investment demand quantity 
  Household factor income share    Government savings rate 
  Intermediate input technology coefficient    Household savings rate 
  Value-added technology coefficient    Factor tax rate 
  Import substitution elasticity    Household direct tax rate 
  Export transformation elasticity    Import tariff rate 
  Factor substitution elasticity    Sales tax rate 
  Consumer price index weight    Wage subsidy value 
  Domestic price index weight     
Endogenous variables  Endogenous variables 
  Consumer price index    Government demand quantity 
  Domestic price index    Household consumption demand quantity 
  Exchange rate    Investment demand quantity 
  Government demand adjustment factor    Intermediate input quantity 
  Foreign savings    Composite quantity 
  Investment demand adjustment factor    Domestic supply quantity 
  Activity price    Transaction margin quantity 
  Composite price    Value-added quantity 
  Domestic supply price (without margin)    Sector and region wage distortion 
  Domestic supply price (with margin)    Economywide average wage rate 
  Value-added price    Total factor income 
  Activity quantity    Total government income 
  Factor demand quantity    Total household income  
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